Arrival scene
Travelling along University Street in the city of Ahmedabad, India, the community of Baori Samaj is partially obscured beyond a dusty field where young men congregate to play cricket on an improvised pitch. Several makeshift vending stalls are erected on one side of the roadway. Turning off the thoroughfare, Baori Samaj fans out in a concentration of homes: the more solid are built of bricks and mortar; others are tents of plastic sheeting with earth floors. Large stones weigh down roofs of corrugated tin, positioned to resist the seasonal winter winds and torrential monsoon rains. Home to approximately 10,000 adivasis, 1 Baori Samaj is a large basti 2 (unauthorized settlement) situated in central Ahmedabad. While not the city's largest basti, it is among its oldest.
Formerly an itinerant group from the neighbouring state of Rajasthan, these Baoris migrated to Ahmedabad in the aftermath of what is remembered in the community as the devastating famine of 1857.
In 2002, the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) demolished 448 Baori homes in Gulbai Tekra (just west of the city centre). This article documents recent actions taken by the AMC to expel Baoris from the inner city, and we follow their 1 Adivasis are widely considered to be the indigenous peoples of India. According to the 2001 census, Scheduled Tribes (ST), those adivasi groups classified by the state, represent approximately 8% of the national population. While the Indian state does not recognize the indigeneity of adivasis, there exists a long history of affirmative action and territorial recognition of identified ST populations (see Corbridge, 2000; Ghosh, 2006) . 2 There are two broad types of insecure housing in Ahmedabad. Chawls are the tenements built in the early twentieth century to house workers engaged in textile manufacturing. Once vibrant working-class neighbourhoods situated in the eastern part of the city, chawls have become concentrated sites of poverty. Scattered throughout Ahmedabad, bastis are unauthorized settlements characterized by various forms of tenure on private and public lands. While the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation argues that there has been a decrease in the number of extra-legal settlements since 1991, it concedes its basti population has doubled in that time (AMC, 2006) . If one combines those living in bastis and chawls, the proportion of people living in what UN-Habitat considers slum conditions approaches 40% of the population. expulsion out to the urban-rural frontier. I argue that informality is mobilized through state practices to suspend Baoris' claims to territory and services, and in doing so represents a political regime of governing in liberalizing Ahmedabad. I work with Roy's (2005: 148) admonishment to move past dichotomous notions of the informal, and rather work toward its understanding as an expansive 'mode of urbanization' operating through 'an organizing logic; a system of norms that govern the process of urban transformation'.
Informalization is thus situated at the core of state strategies that enforce a regulatory miasma in the everyday lives of Baoris, and simultaneously drive the production of elite space and new policy regimes that seek to seduce capital in the remaking of the metropolis. I plan to complicate any easy division between the informal and formal, and the civil and uncivil, in an urban topography wherein informality is tied to particular constellations of power working through the entanglement of class, caste and violence.
Baoris' eviction to the urban edge is set against the socio-political landscape of Gujarat; whether we consider the proliferation of special economic zones, the unmaking of unionized labour, growth of spectral housing, urban renewal or civic governance increasingly steered by private capital, Gujarat remains 'ground zero' for aggressive Indian experiments in economic liberalization (Breman, 2004; Gidwani, 2008) . In Ahmedabad, we also continue to witness informality and liberalization intersecting with a muscular Hindu nationalism in the production of a globalizing Hinduized metropolis (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000) .
In addressing questions of sovereignty within regimes of informalization, I am not simply interested in the technologies of discipline and rule. In many respects, this research began with an interest in what Holston (2007) describes (writing of Brazil's favelas) as 'insurgent citizenship', i.e. how insurgency movements in the informal world expand the political by reconfiguring the terrain of democratic politics. The informalizing world continues to generate considerable scholarly attention as the setting for radical politics that move from 'quiet encroachments' (Bayat, 2004) to 'deep democracy' (Appadurai, 2001) , 'new ways of life' (AlSayyad, 2004) to progressive 'civic governmentality' (Roy, 2009a) . In Gulbai Tekra, I may not have encountered a space of radical insurgency, but one that nonetheless complicates notions of city and citizenship through quotidian forms of resistance. For Baoris, living and working in extra-legal conditions has not precluded possibilities for negotiations with the local agents of state and capital. This motivates situating Baoris' organizing within a spatiality that Chatterjee This article draws on 14 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Ahmedabad. I worked through social networks that opened up in the city. I observed and scripted a field journal, which provided a rich descriptive account of the research process and a means by which to contextualize testimonies and to understand how meanings are situational and narrated in relation to specific social spaces and cultural contexts. I took photographs and conducted interviews; like a magpie, I gleaned compelling narratives and life experiences -many of which have been translated into this article. There were also important collaborative strategies and methods that emerged in my research with Baoris. For instance, I spent two months making street video with Baoris in collaboration with a professional filmmaker from Vancouver. Together we created a series of short documentary films that animated local issues identified, scripted and filmed by community residents; these works were seen by several thousand people in a number of street screenings. As part of this collaboration, I donated a computer and hand-held video cameras to Vidya, a street theatre society of which Baoris are among the founding members. Considered as an important site for what Richa Nagar and Susan Geiger (2007: 273) describe as 'situated solidarities', this video-making emerged directly out of the desires of Baoris to access the skills and technologies of digital video production. My ethnographic work with Baoris was part of a broader research programme in the city, one involving extended research in a second adivasi community, as well as a long list of recorded and transcribed interviews conducted with civil rights workers, community leaders, NGOs and city planners.
Living beyond the pale
With a long history of itinerant activity in northwestern India, Baoris have been settled in Ahmedabad for well over a century. Unlike many others migrating to Ahmedabad during the nineteenth century, Baoris never accessed formal employment in industrial textile manufacturing. Excluded from unionized jobs and membership in powerful trade unions, they integrated themselves into informal economies. They sold oxen before the introduction of mechanized agriculture and, during Ahmedabad's boom years of textile production, Baoris made rope out of rejected yarn, selling it in the local bazaar economy.
Most recently, Baoris have used their expertise as artisans to produce plaster statues.
Considered to be men's work, statue-making pervades every nook of public space in Gulbai Tekra. Many Baori women work as domestics in the homes of the surrounding middle classes, typifying the gendered division of informal labour markets whereby women occupy the lowest-paid jobs. The early evenings often find young Baori men working the busy intersections along C.G. Road or the Law Gardens, hawking belts and watches. While Baoris may not be on the lowest rung of the urban economy, they struggle with persistent poverty, and their shared toil illustrates the ingenuity required to survive near the bottom of the labour hierarchy as craftspeople and domestics.
Baoris live and work at the fringe of legality. Their labour is undertaken in direct transgression of the bylaws governing the use and access of public territory. They are considered by municipal authorities to be illegal occupiers of public land with no rights of tenure. Baoris' quasi-illegality, however, does not suggest a space void of regulation.
In the absence of legitimate claims to services, residents have nonetheless secured marginal access to rudimentary civic amenities through a variety of informal tactics. For decades, Baoris have tapped electricity off the main city grid by running illicit power lines to individual homes. While a water main was being dug through the area, Baoris managed to bribe municipal workers to build an unauthorized junction pipe that brought communal water taps into the community. Their labour, tenure and negotiation of services refocuses informality as not simply political economy, but rather what AlSayyad (2004: 15) describes as a 'lived experience' that frames the everyday lives of the urban poor. Baoris have thus long deployed what Bayat (2004: 90) argues to be the 'quiet encroachment of the ordinary' -the actions through which 'quiet rebels' (Bayat, 2000: 533) lay claims in ways that contravene the territories of the propertied.
Importantly, Baoris' transgressions have been tacitly allowed by the state, suggesting a spatial politics wherein any dealings with such communities imply a tacit acknowledgment of various extra-legal practices. As a result, local state actors must deal with the poor as exceptions to the rule of law; it is precisely because so many labour in informal economies and inhabit territory with illicit tenure that the state has to devise ways of governing without disrupting the sanctity of property and legality. 'There is thus an entire set of para-legal arrangements', argues Chatterjee (2004: 56) , 'that can grow to deliver civic services and welfare benefits to population groups whose very habitation lies on the other side of legality'. As exceptions to the formal rule of law, it is only through a number of implicit arrangements that Baoris have maintained tenuous claims to territory and labour in the metropolis. This extra-legal accommodation, however, is always provisional; by its very nature, Baoris' 'right to the city' is highly unstable, dependent on an exceptionality that can be revoked whenever it suits the objectives of state and capital.
Suspending the right of the exception
Baoris' tacit agreement with the AMC was suspended in 2002, when the city demolished 448 homes in Gulbai Tekra, an action that displaced a third of the community from the inner city. The AMC had tried previously to expel Baoris, but residents were successful in securing a stay order from the High Court of Gujarat temporarily blocking demolitions.
The city government took the issue to the Supreme Court of India in New Delhi. It won the case, legitimizing the slum clearance on the basis that Baoris were illegally occupying an 80-foot-wide roadway outlined in its town planning scheme. This is a familiar strategy deployed by the planning apparatus across India, where town planning is mobilized to displace the poor who are framed as illegal usurpers of public territory, and a threat to health, security and planning (Baviskar, 2003; Bhan and Menon-Sen, 2007) . Authorizing the destruction of homes, the AMC's court order reflects the Indian judiciary's increasing role in the process of urban dispossession. While there may be nothing particularly new about slum demolitions in India, many argue that, over the past decade, we have witnessed a reorientation of the courts as to whose rights take precedence under the rule of law and a narrowing of the judiciary's interpretation of fundamental rights, specifically those enshrined in the 'right to life' clause in article 21 of the constitution (Ramanathan, 2002; Shukla, 2006; Ghertner, 2008; Bhan, 2009) . Baoris vehemently opposed the razing of homes, in large measure because they claim that the city government utilized its court order to illegally clear territory that remains under private ownership.
There is a great deal of ambiguity regarding the ownership of land in Gulbai Tekra. Originally, the entire area was under the private title of a Parsi landlord who permitted Baoris to settle in the area in exchange for the payment of rent. During the 1960s, ownership passed to two new proprietors, one of whom was elected a city councillor. After having assumed political office, the city councillor sold his land in Gulbai Tekra to the AMC. The details of the transaction remain unclear. The landlord either sold the territory of his own volition, or the state exercised eminent domain through the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 -the primary means by which state agencies appropriate land for 'public' purposes.
3 Regardless, the sale to the AMC converted Baoris' territory into public land, thus transforming the community from renters with semi-formal or customary tenure into extra-legal occupiers of public space. Bhargava (1983: 18) , is common throughout India, with many cities lacking proper documentation of urban land holdings (see also Roy, 2003) . The lack of centralized or accessible records means that it is often very difficult to establish the legal ownership of territory. Displaced Baoris argue that if the ownership of land in Gulbai Tekra remains unmapped, the city has no legal right to carry out demolitions. Municipal authorities maintain that the entire area is under the domain of the AMC and that Baoris are illegally occupying public territory. I will return to the production of this ambiguity, but suffice to say it is such regulatory uncertainty which empowers planning authorities to enact what Agamben (1998) describes as the state of exception, which in this context refers to the planning apparatus flexing its sovereign power to suspend Baoris' 'right' as exceptions to the rule of law.
Baoris' displacement was happening in the lead-up to a changing policy terrain designed to produce a 'slum-free' Ahmedabad. In 2010, India's central government announced a national policy, Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY), designed to stimulate low-cost housing for slum dwellers in 250 cities across the country, a response to the doubling of India's slum population in the preceding decade. The launching of RAY was rapidly followed by Gujarat's government unveiling its Regulations for the Rehabilitation and Redevelopment of the Slums (RRRS) in July 2011 -a new initiative managed by the Urban Development Department, which boldly proclaimed plans for a 'slum-free'
Ahmedabad. As a public-private partnership, the RRRS exemplifies what Peck and
Tickell (2002) dub 'roll-out neoliberalism', which in this case refers to new models and incentives designed to get private developers into the business of slum redevelopment.
Under the RRRS, in return for relocating slum dwellers, the AMC enforces the eviction process and, most critically, raises the allowable floor-space index, which private developers can either use on land cleared of slums or transfer to other projects elsewhere in the city. While it is premature to judge the effects of the RRRS, one fears that it will do little more than formalize the monopoly rights of private capital over Ahmedabad's slumlands (see Government of Gujarat, 2010). Importantly, the AMC retains the authority to determine entitlements, and those excluded from developmental measures (now led by private developers) will be forced to fend for themselves.
Baoris' displacement is not only taking place within a recalibrating policy landscape, but also against the backdrop of a distinct shift in the moral and aesthetic terrain of the metropolis. Since the 1990s, Chatterjee (2008: 62) argues, the willingness of the middle classes to accommodate the urban poor has waned, suggesting that there is a hegemony of 'the logic of corporate capital among the urban middle classes', and thus a consensus has emerged amid Indian elites who have prioritized rapid economic growth and urban regeneration regardless of the human costs. Marked by violence, urban renewal is often being pursued, according to Baviskar (2003: 89-90) , through a 'bourgeois environmentalism', which has emerged as an 'organised force' whereby 'upper-class concerns and aesthetics, leisure, safety, and health have come significantly to shape the disposition of urban spaces'. For Ghertner (2011: 1) , this activism represents the efforts of private property owners to 'depict slums as zones of incivility and "nuisance" ', mobilizing to impose middle-class 'norms of civility and civil virtue' and, in doing so, produce 'exclusionary urban imaginaries'. The extent to which middle-class activism has influenced Baoris' eviction remains a project for the future. Nevertheless their displacement is taking place within an urban transformation wherein higher-caste Hindu codes of conduct, aesthetics and territories interface with a powerful legal and popular discourse that forges a correlation between degeneracy and poverty that is utilized to legitimize the erasure of slums under the rhetorical cover of beautification, security and public health.
But what of the 448 Baori families displaced in the 2002 clearances ? Baviskar (2003: 96) reminds us that while violent displacement lies at the core of India's urban transformation, the poor's 'hope of permanence' is not always a 'foolhardy fantasy'. In many respects, dislocated Baoris are among the more 'fortunate' given that they successfully fought to obtain access to a state-sponsored resettlement programme. But theirs is a deeply ambiguous 'fortune' -one that traces a distressing geography along the urban-rural fringe.
Displacement
Displaced Baoris were initially relocated to a housing complex in Odhav -an area of concentrated heavy industry on the eastern fringe of the city. Built in 2000 by the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority (AUDA), the Baori resettlement camp comprised 1,500 housing units in a series of multi-story tenements. Families were given a small cash payment of 1,000 rupees (US $20) to offset the costs of displacement.
Informed that this was temporary accommodation, it took the AMC four years to shift
Baoris to a second housing complex in Vishala, situated amongst farmers' fields along the southwestern edge of the city.
Conditions for dislocated Baoris could have been much worse had they not secured access to a state-sponsored resettlement programme. In Gujarat, the state has a legal obligation to provide alternative accommodation for displaced populations who can 'prove' their tenure on 'public' land back to 1976. The criteria for accessing such compensation is antiquated in Gujarat, a state which refuses to revise its qualifying date Baoris only qualified for a resettlement programme because they held the necessary documentation: rent receipts dating their tenure in Gulbai Tekra back to the early 1960s (Figure 1 ). In working with an indigenous community in Argentina, Gordillo (Baviskar, 2003; Bhan and Menon-Sen, 2007; Desai, 2012) . Illustrating how resettlement in the city is rife with violence and exclusion, I return to Baoris' experiences of displacement, their relocation tracing a distressing spatiality along Ahmedabad's urbanrural frontier.
Splintering urbanisms
It is a long drive from the inner city to the Baori resettlement colony out on the urbanrural periphery. One has to follow the Sabarmati river southward as the business district merges into residential neighbourhoods, which in turn give way to farmland. This is where Lefebvre (1989) describes, rather despondently, the city losing itself within 'une metaphorphose planetaire', a global urban metamorphosis in which the urban centre now generates its own periphery -the industrialization of cities usurped by the urbanization process itself (Merrifield, 2011) . This is a metamorphosis prompting Davis (2004: 23) to suggest that there has been a marked uncoupling of urbanization and industrialization, with the urban edge increasingly the 'dumping ground for a surplus population'. This is where, according to Roy (2003: 145) , 'liberalization gnaws on the boundaries of the urban', where cities degrade traditional forms of labour, leaving rural migrants and dislocated urbanites in search of work that no longer exists. It is an 'alien habitat', argues Merrifield (2011: 105) that has become 'neither meaningfully urban nor rural; the result of a vicious process of dispossession, sucking people into the city while spitting others out of the gentrifying centre, forcing poor urban old-timers and vulnerable newcomers onto an expanding periphery'.
Situated along the Sabarmati river's fertile plain, the Baori resettlement colony emerges unexpectedly, a dozen towers rising up from the surrounding grazing land (Figure 2 ). Life on the urban periphery is hard for Baoris, and their displacement has produced a set of issues that exacerbate their precarious situation. There are no paved roads, streetlights, schools or clinics anywhere in the vicinity. The complex's close proximity to the river poses health risks. Flooding is not unusual during the annual monsoon, bringing with it disease. Clogged storm drains -choked with filthy standing water -are a breeding ground for cholera, dysentery and dengue fever. With no organized garbage disposal or sewer infrastructure, waste is thrown into adjacent fields and residents must defecate outside. The conditions of resettlement were such that it was only those individuals providing proof of tenure in Gulbai Tekra back to 1976 who were eligible for resettlement. It was nonetheless striking to find families of ten or more crowded into 12 x 12 foot rooms. When I last visited the resettlement colony in 2009, it was less than 3 years old, and yet its electrical circuits were failing, water pumps were broken and cement foundations were cracked -all of this in a major earthquake zone. It is unclear who is responsible for the provision of services and maintenance of infrastructure. Baoris claim that no municipal worker has ever visited the area. The provision of some services, the absence of many others, the not knowing who is responsible, invokes Rose's (1999) sense that 'self-responsibilization' is a central operating mechanism of liberalization, meaning the poor are left to negotiate services as best they can. The AMC has assured Baoris that they will not be displaced from Vishala in the immediate future. It is not an entirely comforting guarantee. There is little doubt that, when it becomes attractive for capital to transform this territory, Baoris will be forced to relocate. 'In the global city', Suresh keenly observed, 'there is no place for slums. We will have to go to the outskirts of the city . . . to areas such as Sanand near Chagodar
Highway. We will have to move again, that is sure' (interview with the author, 15 March 2009). As urban nomads in twenty-first-century Gujarat, Suresh points to a future of enforced mobility along the ever-shifting urban-rural frontier, and his identification of 'Sanand near Chagodar Highway' is significant. It projects Baoris' forced march southwards from Vishala, moving the community close to a recently established 1,100-hectare industrial zone, home to the Tata Nano factory, where the assembly line rolls out the Nano -the world's cheapest car. Gujarat's state-sponsored persecution of minorities continues to provoke much protest and attention (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000; Mahadevia, 2002; Shani, 2007; Jaffrelot, 2012) . It is invoked to demonstrate how liberalization, renewal and Hindu nationalism intersect to enact varied forms of violence within the informalized production of urban territory. Documenting the 'decosmopolitanization' of Mumbai in the 1990s, Appadurai (2000: 630) argues that we are witnessing the 'hypermaterialization' of the urban citizenry 'through ethnic mobilization and public violence'. He draws a direct correlation between industrial reorganization, informal housing and the ritualized violence of the politicized Hindu right, which is mobilized to carry out an urban cleansing reconfiguring Indian cities of the future as 'sacred national space, ethnically pure but globally competitive ' (ibid.: 644) . This is as, or perhaps more, applicable to Ahmedabad, a city scarred by significant violence, suggesting a deeper problematic, one that Swyngedouw (2011: 370) describes as the emergence of the 'post-political' -the eclipse of democratic rights and spaces as global capital consolidates a 'post-democratic socio-spatial configuration'. It is tempting to script Ahmedabad as one such 'postdemocratic' spatiality, a city where many -if not most -live in some form of extralegality, where over 125,000 unionized workers have been ejected from textile manufacturing, a city that continues to witness state-sponsored ethnic cleansing. This is perhaps a terrain where the 'right to the city' (Lefebvre, 1974) has morphed into an urban metamorphosis (Lefebvre, 1989) stripping away the democratic potential of cities where, according to Merrifield (2011: 108) , we no longer have citizens, but rather rightless spaceless subjects 'cut off from the past but somehow excluded from the future;
deadened by the daily grind of hustling a living'. Here, then, are the (undifferentiated) urban subjects rendered vulnerable by global capital within an expanding global urban transformation, a vein of theorizing that takes its most virulent form in Agamben's (1998) provocative suggestion that we are living in a time where the dominant political model is no longer the city but that of the concentration camp; we are all now subjects, or rather detainees awaiting our biometrics to be collected and rights suspended. (2004) argues that such associations are instrumental to the success of the poor, given that they can function to mediate settlements with capital and state. 'Those in political society', writes Chatterjee (2008: 12) , 'make their claim on government, and are in turn governed, not within the framework of constitutionally defined rights and laws, but rather through temporary, contextual and unstable arrangements arrived at through direct political negotiations'.
The ABS was formed as a means by which residents sought to negotiate with AMC officials and Anil Bakeri, the private company seeking to transform the area into middle-class residential apartments. The first action of the ABS was to bring their struggle to the attention of elected officials. Here, where we are living, they demolish our homes. When we go on the streets to sell our products, they don't allow us to sit there. There is no question about any help from them. The government has not even come here to see our plight or Baoris' (in)ability to contest the informalization of their claims has been further constrained. According to Chatterjee, maneuvering to assert entitlements often depends upon securing one's visibility as a recognized population. He thus draws a sharp distinction between citizens and populations -the former are framed within the imagined space of the nation state whose rights are protected by the rule of law, the latter inhabit the heterogeneity of the social and constitute the real terrain of democratic politics -they are the only usable categories of biopower, which must produce aggregates of people who are the targets of policy designed to ensure security and welfare. 'While the political fraternity of citizens had to be constantly affirmed as one and indivisible', Chatterjee (2004: 35-6) argues, 'there is no one entity of the governed. There was always a multiplicity of population groups that were the objects of governmentality -multiple targets with multiple characteristics requiring multiple techniques of administration'.
Baoris have long struggled to establish themselves as a legitimate population within the administrative structures of state power. This is striking given that one of their unique characteristics is that, unlike many others in political society, Baoris are not a mixed inter-caste community whose identity and moral authority is forged out of the shared occupation of land. 'Our community', argues Suresh, 'is one that has a unique language and ways of living, and is of a completely different kind' (interview with the author, 15 March 2009). 'We are from the Baori community', Chamanbhai states: 'We will not prefer to stay with, for example, the Thakor community, which is just in front of us. We will not permit them to live with us. We will not permit them to stay with us. This is because our customs, rules and regulations are different' (interview with the author, 20 
The limits of informal politics
The multiple sites of Baoris' organizing suggest a terrain that complicates any dichotomy hewn between the formal and informal, the legal and extra-legal, the civil and the political. Firstly, the formal order of things has retained some meaning for Baoris. Until the 1960s, they possessed customary tenure, and claims continue to be made around this territorial ambiguity. They have managed to acquire ration cards and, during the 2002 evictions, Baoris secured a stay order from the High Court of Gujarat, even if this failed to halt the AMC from enacting its slum clearance. While relocation is leading to aggravated socioeconomic marginalization, Baoris have nonetheless accessed a statesponsored resettlement programme (many in the city are less 'fortunate'). Lastly, Baoris continue to press for inclusion within the population schematics around which various developmental measures are structured in India. That said, as I have argued throughout, Baoris' inclusion within the formal urban order has not only been marginal at best, but also significantly eroded within the informalized production of territory and governance in liberalizing Ahmedabad. These conditions reflect Roy's (2009b: 80) Baoris' experiences also sit uneasily within the kinds of political opportunities that are sometimes ascribed to the urban poor living and working within the informalizing world -the potential for radical democratization that Chatterjee suggests is possible within political society. I do not want to figure a model that determines success or failure, but geography matters when it comes to negotiating claims with state and capital. 'Success' is far more likely if a community can establish itself as a recognized population, has well-organized leadership, support from the middle classes, and where struggles are situated in sites around which media, activists and NGOs coalesce. Many of these conditions are absent in Baori Samaj. They are in a precarious bargaining position. As their collective numbers are small, and less than 50% of Baoris in Gulbai Tekra appear on electoral registers, the community has been unable to mobilize their 'vote bank' to place pressure on elected officials. Those displaced to the urban-rural fringe no longer occupy valuable inner-city territory, and their struggles have not garnered the attention of sympathetic middle classes or NGOs through which their entitlements could be brokered with state agencies. There has thus been little opportunity to establish a 'politics of partnership' that Appadurai (2001: 24) argues can lead to 'deep democracy ' (ibid.: 32) or what Roy (2009a: 159) describes as a politics of inclusion that opens up new forms of 'civic governmentality'.
Baoris' displacement focuses the limits for agency in the informalizing metropolis, particularly when situated within the spatial entanglement of liberalization, Hindu nationalism and urban restructuring taking hold in Ahmedabad. The community's eviction and relocation illustrates the uneasy ground upon which agreements rest in political society. As it has become attractive to develop land in Gulbai Tekra, Baoris' capacity to be governed as an exception has been suspended. The pressures of gentrification, a progressively hostile policy terrain facilitating urban renewal driven by private capital, and judicial recalibrations mean that those living in extra-legal conditions are increasingly stuck between a rock and a hard place in Ahmedabad. Not only has the ambiguity of rights and territories facilitated Baoris' expulsion, but it has also enabled the AMC to suspend the very possibility of accessing resources. It is now difficult for Baoris to use their ration cards; basic services are not being provided to their resettlement colony; and the city government has not delivered on the promise of regularized tenure.
With no documentation papers, Baoris possess no physical means to prove their status on the urban periphery.
The above offers a cautionary tale for those working to map an alternative sphere of justice within the informalizing metropolis; Baoris' displacement demonstrates that what for Chatterjee (2004) represents a space with potential for radical democratization is also a space rife with violence. 'Coercion and violence', writes Ghosh (2006: 525) , 'remain unmentioned as he [Chatterjee] struggles to lay out a terrain of governmentality that seems to always operate through recognition, dialogue, mutually agreed-on settlements, and inclusion . . . these heterogeneous Others seem to always find their designated slots in the planners' map through a much contested but "negotiated" process'. Baoris temper enthusiasm for political society as a site for inclusive democratic politics. Their eviction and resettlement draw sharp attention to those heterogeneous Others whose lives are marked by the instrumental role of violence, and the way that the accelerated suspension of 'rights' are capitalized upon to enact urban and governmental transformation. Despite numerous attempts to work through legal and extra-legal channels, Baoris' displacement has yet to be negotiated; their designated slot on the planner's map succinctly narrated by one Baori woman who argued simply that: 'The government has thrown us away like garbage' (personal correspondence with the author,
